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Mission of the BNP Paribas Hedge Fund Centres 
 
The mission of the BNP Paribas Hedge Fund Centres is to facilitate, encourage, and sponsor 
high-level academic research on hedge funds. The Centres also provide outstanding education 
to students, executives, and investors, and publish objective and independent information on 
hedge funds, while promoting understanding and awareness of alternative investment 
strategies. Through excellence in research on alternative investments, the Centres are 
recognized for their capacity to foster stimulating exchange of opinions, and to develop a 
knowledgeable and objective information base regarding hedge funds.     
 
The primary objectives of the BNP Paribas Hedge Fund Centre at the Singapore Management 
University are to  
 
1. conduct and disseminate high quality academic hedge fund research 
2. educate finance practitioners and the investor public on hedge funds, and  
3. raise the profile of the hedge fund industry in Asia and Singapore 
 
To achieve these goals, the Centre will collaborate closely with its sister centres at the London 
Business School and HEC. Moreover at all times, the Centre is absolutely committed to the 
highest ethical conduct and will actively avoid any conflicts of interest with outside parties.   
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Hedge funds and analyst optimism 
 
Sung-Gon Chung and Melvyn Teo1 
 
Abstract 
 
We find that analysts are more likely to issue favorable recommendations for stocks 
predominantly owned hedge funds. Moreover, these optimistic recommendations translate into 
poorer stock performance over the next three to six months. Hedge funds take advantage of 
these flattering reports by concurrently offloading their stock holdings. Our results suggest that 
analysts are reluctant to downgrade stocks held by their most important clients.  
 
 
“Wall Street research departments are rapidly organizing themselves to serve their best paying 
customers: hedge funds” 
-Institutional Investor Magazine, 14 October 2003 
 
In a post-Spitzer era, Wall Street research departments can no longer partake in the 
revenues from investment banking. Instead, anecdotal evidence suggests that sell-side analysts 
now cater increasingly to hedge funds which trade frequently and can therefore generate the 
brokerage commissions needed to sustain research.2 Analysts are spending more time on the 
phone with their hedge fund clients and churning out new research products geared towards 
hedge funds.3 Some market observers have raised concerns that hedge funds wield so much 
power over analysts that they often pressure analysts to write reports in line with the funds’ 
views.4 One worry is that, while sell-side analysts no longer need to contend with investment 
banking-driven agency issues, they must now grapple with new, hedge fund-induced conflicts of 
interests. 
 
In this newsletter, we explore the relationship between hedge fund stock holdings and 
sell-side analyst recommendations. We ask the following: Are analysts more likely to issue 
favorable recommendations for stocks held by hedge funds? If so, are those favorable 
recommendations biased, i.e., do they forecast returns negatively? Finally, do hedge funds take 
advantage of the recommendation optimism by offloading their shares of stocks heavily favored 
by analysts?   
                                                 
1 Sung-Gon Chung is Assistant Professor of Accounting at the Singapore Management University. Melvyn 
Teo is Associate Professor of Finance and Director, BNP Paribas Hedge Fund Centre at the Singapore 
Management University. E-mail: melvynteo@smu.edu.sg. Phone: +65-6828-0735. 
2 See “Unsettled on Wall Street” Institutional Investor Magazine, 14 October 2003. Hedge fund trading 
volume now accounts for 40 to 50 percent of the daily trading volume in US stock markets (Cox, 2006). 
Moreover, according to Greenwich Associates, Wall Street collects $33 million a year in trading 
commissions from the average hedge fund versus $16 million from the average mutual fund. 
3 “Hey Big Spender, Analysts on Call” International Herald Tribune, 6 March 2007. 
4 “Hedge Funds and Equity Research: Fair Comment or Foul?” The Economist, 1 April 2006, and “SEC 
Looks at Hedge Funds’ Trades” The Wall Street Journal, 13 February 2009.  
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Our empirical analysis indicates that analysts are more likely to issue buy and strong buy 
recommendations for stocks held by hedge funds. After controlling for a variety of factors 
affecting analyst recommendations, we show that stocks predominantly owned by hedge funds 
in a given quarter are more likely to attract favorable recommendations from analysts in the next 
quarter. The effect is economically and statistically significant. A ten percent surge in hedge 
fund ownership, engenders a 10.43 percent increase in the probability that an analyst will issue 
a buy or strong buy recommendation next quarter. 
  
Next, we show that stocks held by hedge funds do not deserve the praise lavished by 
analysts in their research reports. We find that the returns to buy and strong buy 
recommendations are more negative when hedge funds hold large positions in the stock. The 
three- and six-month size-adjusted returns are 2.9 percent and 6.0 percent lower, respectively, 
for the top decile of stocks sorted by hedge fund ownership than for the bottom decile of stocks. 
 
Do hedge funds take advantage of the overly optimistic analyst prognostications by 
conveniently offloading their stock positions? We show that when analysts issue optimistic 
recommendations on stocks held by hedge funds, the funds are more likely to reduce their 
positions in those stocks during the same quarter. In particular, for any given quarter, when the 
mean analyst consensus for a stock is equal to or greater than a buy, hedge funds are 11.1 
percent more likely to unwind their positions in the same stock. Conversely, under the same 
circumstances, other institutional investors are 25.2 percent less likely to sell a stock.  
 
These findings suggest that hedge funds, by pressurizing sell-side analysts into issuing 
overly optimistic recommendations on stocks that they hold, are able to offload their equity 
positions to other unsuspecting institutional investors. 
 
Data 
 
Our data set consists of the intersection of four large databases: the Thompson 
Financial 13F institutional database constructed from institutional investors’ 13F filings, the 
I/B/E/S database of research analyst recommendations, the Centre for Research in Security 
Prices at Chicago (CRSP) stock data, and Compustat firm characteristics data.  The sample 
period extends from the third quarter of 2003 to the last quarter of 2008. We time our sample to 
start after the April 2003 Global Research Analyst Settlement which curtails investment banking 
driven conflicts of interest amongst sell-side analysts.  
 
We cull our main variable of interest, hedge fund long position data, from the Thompson 
Financial 13F institutional database. Institutions with more than $100 million in equities must 
report their equity ownership in quarterly 13F filings to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (henceforth SEC). The majority of institutions (such as pension funds, 
endowments, mutual funds, and hedge funds) are required to report equity positions in excess 
of ten thousand shares or $200,000 in market value for all firms traded on an exchange or 
quoted on the Nasdaq National Market System. The institutions report aggregate holdings for 
their firm, e.g., hedge fund family, regardless of how many individual fund portfolios they 
manage.  
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To identify hedge fund families in the Thompson Financial 13F institutional database, we 
draw on the filtering methodology of Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004). First, every year, we 
obtain from Bloomberg a list of hedge funds that report 13F filings. Next, we look up each hedge 
fund by name in the 13F institutional database. We find records for 1,011 managers. These are 
the relatively large managers that hold sufficient amounts of U.S. stocks to exceed the $100 
million reporting threshold. Then, we discard some managers because hedge fund assets only 
make up a small part of their aggregated institutional portfolio. For each manager, we check 
whether the firm is a registered investment adviser with the SEC. Registration is a prerequisite 
for conducting non-hedge fund business such as advising mutual funds and pension plans. If 
the institution is not registered, we include it in our sample. If the manager is registered, we 
check the manager’s Form ADV. To include a registered manager in our sample, we require (a) 
that at least 50 percent of its clients are “Other pooled investment vehicles (e.g., hedge funds)” 
or “High net worth individuals,” and (b) that it charges a performance fee. This process leaves 
us with 711 managers.  
 
During our sample period, the I/B/E/S dataset records 194,507 recommendations for 
6,343 unique companies made by 7,367 analysts at 514 brokerages. The Thompson Financial 
13F database reports holdings data on 8,104 unique companies. The intersection of the four 
databases contains 4,872 unique companies. I/B/E/S codes recommendations from one (strong 
buy) to five (sell). As is standard, we reverse the order so that larger numbers indicate more 
buoyant recommendations. One issue is that new, reiterated, or revised recommendations 
arrive and are recorded by I/B/E/S irregularly and relatively infrequently when compared to 
earnings forecasts. We resolve the relative lack of timely analyst recommendations by focusing 
on the most recent recommendations recorded in the one-year window ending in quarter t. 
Therefore, we implicitly assume that in the absence of a revision, a three-quarter-old 
recommendation is still current in quarter t.  
 
Empirical evidence 
 
Our first set of tests focuses on the effect of hedge fund long equity holdings on the level 
of analyst recommendations. We ask whether sell-side analysts are more likely to issue buy and 
strong buy recommendations for stocks predominantly held by hedge funds.  
 
The baseline cross-sectional regression that we estimate can be expressed as: 
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where 1,_ +tjCONSENSUSBUY  is an indicator variable that is equal to one when the mean 
consensus recommendation for stock j at quarter t+1 is greater than or equal to a buy, 
tjHOLDHF ,_ is the total shares of a stock j held by hedge funds at the end of quarter t and 
scaled by the number of shares outstanding, and tjHOLDINSTOTHER ,__  is the total shares 
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of stock j held by other institutions at the end of quarter t and scaled by the number of shares 
outstanding. In addition, for stock j, tjVOLUME ,  is daily volume scaled by shares outstanding 
and averaged over the last six months, tjME ,  is market equity, tjMEBE ,)/(  is book-to-market 
equity, and tjCARLAG ,_  is past six-month, size decile-adjusted, buy and hold return. We 
control for the stock specific variables to account for the potential impact of stock size on analyst 
recommendations and in response to Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee’s (2004) findings that 
analysts generally recommend high volume, extreme growth, and positive momentum stocks. 
The independent variable OTHER_INST_HOLD is included so as to cater for the possible 
influence of institutional investors who do not manage hedge funds (see Ljungqvist, Marston, 
Starks, Wei, and Yan (2007)). We also estimate regressions on a second indicator variable 
BUY_REC that takes a value of one when the individual analyst recommendation is a buy or 
strong buy, and equals to zero otherwise.  
 
 
 
The results in Table 1 indicate that the coefficient estimates on the HF_HOLD variable in 
both these regressions are positive and statistically significant. They suggest that, following a 
ten percent surge in hedge fund ownership and after controlling for covariation with the other 
variables, the probability next quarter that the recommendation consensus or an individual 
Independent variables
HF_HOLD   1.827**  1.474** 1.123** 1.043**
( 10.65) ( 7.85) ( 5.83) ( 4.39)
OTHER_INST_HOLD -0.022 (-0.07)
(-0.18) (-0.92)
Log(ME) -0.336** -0.039**
(-9.28) (-2.71)
BE/ME -1.023** -0.846**
(-20.71) (-12.95)
LAG_CAR6 0.900** 0.516**
( 8.78) ( 8.24)
VOLUME -0.021** -0.005**
(-7.51) (-3.57)
Adjusted/Pseudo R-Square 0.003 0.073 0.001 0.0166
Number of observations 60,544 60,476 316,855 316,695
Table 1
Regressions on analyst recommendations  
This table reports results from regressions on consensus recommendations and individual analyst recommendations. Two sets of regressions are
estimated. The dependent variables include: BUY_CONSENSUS, and BUY_REC. BUY_CONSENSUS is an indicator variable that is equal to one if
the average recommendation is equal to or greater than a 'Buy', and is equal to zero otherwise. BUY_REC is an indicator variable that is equal to
one if the individual recommendation is a 'Buy' or 'Strong Buy', and is equal to zero otherwise. Logit regressions are estimated. All the dependent
variables are measured in quarter t. The independent variables include the following: HF_HOLD is the sum of shares of a firm held by hedge funds
at quarter t-1 scaled by shares outstanding at the end of the quarter. OTHER_INST_HOLD is the sum of shares held by other institutions
(excluding hedge funds) at quarter t-1 scaled by shares outstanding at the end of the quarter. ME (in $ millions) is the market value of equity
measured at the end of quarter t-1. BE/ME is the ratio of book value at quarter t-2 to market value of common equity measured at the end of a
quarter t-2. LAG_CAR6 is six-month size decile-adjusted buy-and-hold returns ending in a quarter t-1. VOLUME is the daily volume scaled by
shares outstanding and averaged over the six months preceding the end of a quarter t-1.The standard errors are clustered by firm and year to
account for within-firm and within-year correlations in residuals. The z-statistics and t-statistics derived from the standard errors are in
parentheses. The evaluation period extends from the third quarter of 2003 to the fourth quarter of 2008. *Significant at the 5% level; **Significant
at the 1% level.
BUY_CONSENSUS BUY_REC
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analyst recommendation will be greater than or equal to a buy increases by 14.74 percent and 
10.43 percent, respectively. 
 
Do stocks held by hedge funds deserve the praise lavished by analysts? Our next set of 
tests focuses on the post recommendation performance of stocks owned by hedge funds and 
favored by analysts. Specifically we test whether the size decile-adjusted, buy-and-hold, three-
month and six-month returns following the consensus measuring window are affected by the 
interaction between hedge fund ownership and the indicator variable that is equal to one when 
the consensus equals to or exceeds a buy recommendation. The return regression that we 
estimate is as follows: 
 
tjtjtj
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where 2,_ +tjRETSTOCK is either the three-month or six-month, size decile-adjusted, buy-and-
hold return starting in quarter t+2 for stock j, and the other variables are as per defined earlier.  
 
The results for the regression on three-month size-adjusted returns are reported in the 
leftmost column of Table 2. The coefficient estimate on the interaction between 
BUY_CONSENSUS and HF_HOLD is negative and statistically significant at the one percent 
level (t-statistic = -2.73). It indicates that stocks predominantly held by hedge funds do not 
deserve the buy and strong buy recommendations lavished on them by analysts. Together with 
the previous findings, this suggests that analysts issue overly optimistic reports for stocks 
predominantly held by hedge funds. Inferences remain largely unchanged when we estimate the 
analogous regression on six-month returns. See column three of Table 2. The coefficient 
estimate on the interaction variable is again negative and statistically significant (at the five 
percent level). 
 
 To gauge economic significance, we replace HF_HOLD with RANK_HF_HOLD, a 
decile-ranked variable of HF_HOLD scaled by nine, and re-estimate the return regressions. The 
decile-ranked variable takes values between zero and nine. Therefore, RANK_HF_HOLD takes 
values between zero and one. The coefficient estimate on the interaction between 
BUY_CONSENSUS and RANK_HF_HOLD reflects the difference in three-month (or six-month) 
returns between stocks in the top and bottom hedge fund ownership deciles, whose consensus 
recommendation equals to or exceeds a buy. The results reported in columns two and four of 
Table 2 suggest that stocks favored by analysts in the top hedge fund ownership decile 
underperform stocks favored by analysts in the bottom hedge fund ownership decile by 2.9 
percent and 6.0 percent over the subsequent three and six months, respectively.   
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Do hedge funds take advantage of the optimistic prognostications of sell-side analysts 
by concurrently unwinding their stock positions? Our third set of tests examines changes in 
hedge fund ownership for stocks that are heavily favored by sell-side analysts. If hedge funds 
successfully pressure analysts into issuing optimistic reports on the stocks that they hold, then 
the funds will be highly incentivized to offload their positions in those stocks to take advantage 
of the market’s reaction to analysts’ buy and strong buy recommendations.  
 
To test this, we estimate the following OLS and logit regressions: 
 
tjtjtj
tjtjij
CAReLAGMEBEd
MEcCONSENSUSbBUYaHOLDHF
,,,
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Independent variables
BUY_CONSENSUS 0.010** 0.018** 0.022** 0.036**
( 5.66) ( 8.25) ( 4.95) ( 4.81)
HF_HOLD 0.061 0.145
( 1.15) ( 1.59)
RANK_HF_HOLD 0.02 0.046
( 1.41) ( 1.70)
BUY_CONSENSUS  × HF_HOLD -0.106** -0.245*
(-2.73) (-2.44)
BUY_CONSENSUS  × RANK_HF_HOLD -0.029** -0.060*
(-2.96) (-2.41)
Log(ME) 0.001 ( 0.00) 0.004* 0.004*
( 1.47) ( 1.50) ( 2.02) ( 2.06)
BE/ME 0.025 0.025 0.082 0.082
( 0.90) ( 0.90) ( 1.34) ( 1.35)
LAG_CAR6 -0.008 -0.008 -0.037 -0.037
(-0.34) (-0.34) (-0.62) (-0.62)
Adjusted R-square 0.003 0.003 0.011 0.012
Number of observations 60,110 60,110 60,113 60,113
Regressions on stock returns
Table 2
Three-month return Six-month return
This table reports OLS regressions on three-month and six-month size decile-adjusted buy-and-hold stock returns. The dependent
variables are measured starting in quarter t. The independent variables are as follows: BUY_CONSENSUS is an indicator variable that is
equal to one if the average recommendation in quarter t-1 is equal to or greater than a 'Buy', and is equal to zero otherwise. HF_HOLD is
the sum of shares of a firm held by hedge funds at quarter t-2 scaled by shares outstanding at the end of the quarter. RANK_HF_HOLD
is the decile ranked variable of HF_HOLD divided by nine so that RANK_HF_HOLD ranges from zero to one. ME (in $ millions) is the
market value of equity measured at the end of quarter t-1. BE/ME is the ratio of book value at quarter t-1 to market value of common
equity measured at the end of a quarter t-1. LAG_CAR6 is six-month size decile-adjusted buy-and-hold returns ending in a quarter t-1.
VOLUME is the daily volume scaled by shares outstanding and averaged over the six months preceding the end of a quarter t-1. For
each dependent variable, two sets of regressions are estimated: The first set includes BUY_CONSENSUS and HF_HOLD. The second
set includes BUY_CONSENSUS and RANK_HF_HOLD. The regression standard errors are clustered by firm and year to account for
within-firm and within-year correlations in residuals. The t-statistics are in parentheses. The evaluation period extends from the third
quarter of 2003 to the fourth quarter of 2008. *Significant at the 5% level; **Significant at the 1% level.                    
Dependent variables   
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where tjHOLDHF ,_Δ  is the change in hedge fund ownership in stock j in quarter t, 
tjSELLHF ,_ is an indicator variable that equals to one when the change in hedge fund 
ownership in stock j is negative in quarter t, and equals to zero otherwise, and the independent 
variables are as per defined previously. 
 
 The results from the regressions are reported in the first and second columns of Table 3. 
They indicate that hedge funds are more likely to sell stocks that attract buoyant 
recommendations. Specifically, the coefficient estimate on BUY_CONSENSUS in the logit 
regression indicates that hedge funds are 11.1 percent more likely to sell a stock when the 
consensus is greater than or equal to a buy during the same quarter. Hedge funds appear to be 
trading against the recommendations of sell-side analysts. This effect is statistically significant 
at the one percent level (t-statistic = 5.28).  
 
 
 
 
Independent variables ΔHF_HOLD HF_SELL ΔOTHER_INST_HOLD OTHER_INST_SELL
BUY_CONSENSUS -0.002** 0.111** 0.011** -0.252**
(-3.44) (5.28) (11.43) (-16.98)
Log(ME) -0.000 0.053** 0.000 -0.018
(-1.61) (4.57) (0.49) (-0.78)
BE/ME -0.003** 0.139 -0.004 0.121
(-2.75) (1.75) (-0.91) (1.11)
LAG_CAR6 0.002** -0.178** 0.017** -0.381**
(5.44) (-3.90) (5.96) (-3.96)
Adjusted R-square 0.002 0.0021 0.012 0.007
Number of observations 57,480 57,480 57,480 57,480
This table reports regressions on changes in hedge fund ownership and on changes in other institutional investor
ownership. The dependent variables include ΔHF_HOLD, HF_SELL, ΔOTHER_INST_HOLD, and
OTHER_INST_HOLD. ΔHF_HOLD is the change in hedge fund long positions in quarter t. HF_SELL is an indicator
variable that is equal to one if ΔHF_HOLD is negative, and it equal to zero otherwise. ΔOTHER_INST_HOLD is the
change in other institutions' positions in quarter t. OTHER_INST_SELL is an indicator variable that is equal to one if
ΔOTHER_INST_HOLD is negative, and is equal to zero otherwise. The independent variables are as follows:
BUY_CONSENSUS is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the average recommendation in quarter t is equal to
or greater than a 'Buy', and is equal to zero otherwise. ME (in $ millions) is the market value of equity measured at
the end of quarter t-1. BE/ME is the ratio of book value at quarter t-2 to market value of common equity measured at
the end of a quarter t-2. LAG_CAR6 is six-month size decile-adjusted buy-and-hold returns ending in a quarter t-1.
We estimate OLS and Logit regressions. The standard errors are clustered by firm and year to account for within-
firm and within-year correlations in residuals. The z-statistics and t-statistics are in parentheses. The evaluation
period extends from the third quarter of 2003 to the fourth quarter of 2008. *Significant at the 5% level; **Significant
at the 1% level.
Table 3
Regressions on changes in stock ownership
Dependent variables
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Interestingly, these findings do not apply to other institutional investors. When we 
estimate the analogous regression with ∆OTHER_INST_HOLD where ∆OTHER_INST_HOLD 
is the change in other institution’s stock ownership, the coefficient estimate on 
BUY_CONSENSUS is positive and statistically significant. This suggests that other institutions 
are more likely to increase their positions in a stock, when analysts are optimistic. Similar 
inferences obtain when we estimate the regression with OTHER_INST_SELL, an indicator that 
equals to one when the change in stock ownership by other institutions is negative during that 
quarter, and equals zero otherwise. The coefficient estimate on BUY_CONSENSUS indicates 
that other institutions are 25.2 percent less likely to sell stock when the consensus is greater 
than or equal to a buy. These results are reported in columns three and four of Table 3. 
 
Summary 
 
In line with anecdotal evidence which suggests that sell-side analysts are now under 
tremendous pressure to generate brokerage commissions, we show that sell-side analysts tend 
to issue buy and strong buy recommendations on stocks predominantly held by hedge funds. 
These stocks do not deserve the flattering reports lavished by analysts. The favorable 
recommendations parlay into poor three-month and six-month stock returns going forward. 
Moreover, hedge funds take advantage of the optimistic prognostications by concurrently 
unwinding their stock positions. Our findings suggest that in a post Spitzer-era, the Wall Street 
research departments that have been forcibly weaned off investment banking revenues must 
now contend with new hedge fund-induced conflicts of interests. 
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Update on the Centre’s Activities 
 
Education 
 
The centre is mounting a hedge fund executive education program from the 24-26 of November. 
The course will feature an impressive lineup of instructors including Professor Bill Fung from 
London Business School and hedge fund managers from Artradis, Apollo, and Alphadyne. The 
course fee is S$932 per person after the MAS subsidy and a ten percent early bird discount (for 
registrations before October 16). You may find out more about our executive education program 
here: http://www.smu.edu.sg/centres/hfc/events/hfee10/index.asp 
 
 
Research 
The centre sponsored paper “The Liquidity Risk of Liquid Hedge Funds,” by Melvyn Teo, has 
been accepted for publication at the Journal of Financial Economics.  
Our call for papers via SSRN has attracted 14 paper submissions from academics all around 
the world. The research board will decide on the grant recipients by 30 November 2010.  
Working versions of centre sponsored papers are available for download from our research 
webpage 
 
For more information regarding the BNP Paribas Hedge Fund Centre at SMU and our upcoming 
activities, please contact Ms Karyn Tai, centre coordinator (Tel: +65-6828-0933, E-mail: 
hfc@smu.edu.sg) or visit our webpage at http://www.smu.edu.sg/centres/hfc/index.asp. We look 
forward to receiving your suggestions and comments.  
